Introduction
The recent merger wave in the United States has left observers attempting to uncover explanations for its strength and persistence. Some have suggested that tax factors have played an' important role. Indeed, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 contained several provisions, not effective until the beginning of 1987, that were aimed specifically at reducing the tax advantages available through merger. In two previous papers (Auerbach and Reishus 1988a; 1988b) , we estimated the tax benefits generated by 318 mergers and takeovers that took place in this country over the years 1968-83, and we considered whether the level and type of tax benefits available affected the structure of the merger transactions. Our findings suggested that although tax benefits did not appear • to be important in the majority of transactions involving large, public corporations, in a significant minority of transactions the benefits appeared significant enough to play a role in the decision to merge.
By focusing exclusively on mergers that occurred, we were able to estimate the size of the tax benefits involved but not the role that these benefits played in the actual merger process. The presence of such benefits is a necessary condition for tax factors to influence merger activity, but not a sufficient one. Because the issues involved in changing the ownership and management of a company are extremely complex, it is entirely possible that tax benefits, even if significant, come into play only "at the margin" once other conditions have been satisfied. Thus, it remains unclear whether the tax benefits received by merging firms represent more than simple transfers to the parties involved, or in other words whether the frequency and pattern of takeovers has been significantly influenced by the availability of the tax benefits.
This paper aims to resolve this question by comparing the sample of mergers we previously analyzed with "pseudomergers," ones that did not occur, drawn from random combinations of firms in a broad sample of U.S. corporations. By estimating a "marriage model" based on the differences between mergers that occurred and those that did not, we are able to discern whether the tax benefits observed in the mergers that took place were available with the same size and frequency in the population as a whole (conditional on other factors), or whether the tax benefits were larger than would have occurred by chance, as would be true if tax factors increased the likelihood of a merger.
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section discusses the tax treatment of mergers and acquisitions and what the potential tax benefits of a merger are. Section 6.3 describes our merger sample, the findings we previously reported on the tax benefits from these mergers, and the relationship of such benefits to the structure of the transactions. Section 6.4 outlines the underlying model of merger activity that we use to generate the multinomial logit specification of the merger decision, as well as how we deal with the estimation problem introduced by the large number of alternative mergers in which a firm could engage. Section 6.5 describes the sampling procedure used to create the sample of pseudomergers and the calculation of variables used in the estimation; section 6.6 presents the empirical estimates themselves. The final section offers some brief conclusions concerning the implications of the recent tax law changes for the level of merger activity.
The Tax Benefits of Merger Activity
There are several different ways that companies may reduce taxes through a merger or acquisition, and tax benefits can accrue at both the corporate and the shareholder level. In some cases the tax benefits from a corporate combination are also available through other means, and these benefits should therefore not necessarily be attributed to the merger process. The following description, except where noted, applies to the law in force before 1987, during the years when the mergers in our sample occurred.
The Effects ol Taxation on the Merger Deciston 6.2.1 Corporate Taxation
There are three types of potential corporate tax benefits associated with the combination of two public corporations: increased utilization of tax loss and tax credit carryforwards, increased depreciation deductions obtained by stepping up the basis of assets, and increased interest deductions associated with an increase in the debt-equity ratio of the combined enterprise.
Tax Losses and Credits
Under the tax law, both present and past, corporations with negative taxable income may claim tax refunds based on these losses only to the extent of the previous three years' taxable income (net of intervening losses). Any additional losses must be carried forward, without interest, until the firm has taxable income sufficient to offset them or until they expire, now after 15 years and before 1981 after 5 years.
Estimates in Auerbach and Poterbá (1987) and Altshuler and Auerbach (1987) suggested that for the average large corporation experiencing tax losses, the present value of tax refunds so deferred is on the order of half their face value, because of deferral and expiration. Because both of these studies derived estimates from samples of firms that continued to operate independently, they may have overstated the true population average, since one would expect disappearance from the sample to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of becoming taxable in the near future.
Further restrictions exist on the use of investment tax credits. Until 1977 firms could offset at most half of their taxable income, alter deduction of losses carried back and forward, with investment tax credits. o (This fraction rose to .85 by 1982.) Altshuler and Auerbach estimated that the number of firms paying taxes but carrying credits forward was even larger than the number of firms carrying losses forward and paying no taxes. The size of these tax benefits can be substantial. Auerbach and Poterba found several cases of firms carrying forward losses with a face value of tax refunds in excess of the firm's equity value, suggesting not only that these firms had very low values as the result of poor performance, but also that the market did not expect them to obtain close to the full face value of the tax benefits.
Combination with a "fully" taxable firm that has no tax losses and the potential to absorb more credits than it is currently claiming can increase the value of such a firm's tax benefits. Under prior law, a taxable firm could offset the losses and credits of an acquired firm against its own current and future income, subject to the usual expiration provisions and a variety of additional limitations that varied with how the transaction was structured. Few such limitations applied when the benefits were those of the larger, or acquiring, firm being used to offset the income of the acquired company, as was true, for example, in several of the acquisitions by Penn Central that appear in our sample.
The size of such benefits may actually be understated by focusing on current tax carryforwards, since many firms with previous tax losses and unused credits may also have "built-in" losses that will occur in the future. For example, a firm with assets consisting of a depreciable capital good that one year after purchase proved to be valueless will still be entitled to depreciation deductions in subsequent years even without any cash flow from the asset. Such losses have already occurred, in economic terms, but not for tax purposes.
It has often been suggested that the presence of unused tax benefits does not constitute an incentive to merge because firms can dispose of them in other ways, including leasing and reducing debt. The premise of the "safe harbor" leasing provisions introduced briefly in 1981 was to facilitate such transfers, in part to reduce the possible incentives to merge (Warren and Auerbach 1982) . Nevertheless, the magnitude of unused tax benefits, and the persistence of firms in states that offer such benefits, suggests that the costs to such alternative activities must be large enough to discourage their use in an important number of cases.
Step-Up in Asset Basis Many companies carry assets on their books with a basis for tax purposes equal to a small fraction of their replacement cost. Such assets, if depreciable, provide a small fraction of the depreciation atlowances available on equally productive, newly purchased capital, including used assets that are resold. Hence, resale provides a channel for increasing such allowances. Opposing this potential tax gain is the tax that must be paid when an asset is sold. Under prior law the seller in a normal asset sale had to pay some combination of capital gains and ordinary income taxes on the difference between the sale price and the basis, making such sales by corporations generally unprofitable for tax purposes (Gordon, Hines, and Summers 1987) .
Under the "general utilities" doctrine, however, liquidating distributions of assets to shareholders were exempt from the capital gains portion of this tax liability. These distributions occur, for example, when one corporation acquires another and then liquidates it. They can also occur without an acquisition, with the corporation simply distributing its assets to its individual shareholders. This example has led some observers (such as Gilson, Scholes and Wolfson 1988) to argue that the tax advantage to liquidations does not constitute a tax benefit associated with the act of merging. Although we are aware of no em-pirical evidence on this issue, it seems plausible that there are many cases in which the transaction costs of such liquidations would be prohibitive, particularly when the value of the firm as a continuing operation substantially exceeds the sum of the values of its individual assets.
Increased Interest Deductions
The theory of optimal capital structure offers no easy explanation of the choice of debt-equity ratios in the presence of a substantial tax advantage to debt. Except for Miller's (1977) theory that the individual tax advantages to equity entirely offset the corporate advantage to debt, most hypotheses about optimal capital structure involve individual firms having interior optimal debt-equity ratios determined by the increasing costs to leverage associated, for example, with increased expected bankruptcy costs, increased agency costs, or the increased probability of tax losses. In these models the firm's costs of leverage may increase with the variance of its earnings, since that variance may be associated with a higher probability of bankruptcy and tax losses. Thus, the reduction of idiosyncratic risk, which would produce no value in a perfectly competitive model with efficient securities markets, could increase value directly through a reduction in total bankruptcy costs and in the frequency of tax losses and indirectly through the reduced marginal costs of borrowing. It is therefore possible to derive models without independent managerial motives in which it is optimal for firms to merge to reduce their own risk, with the models also suggesting that these combinations would involve increased leverage.
Another way in which borrowing could encourage takeovers would be if one of the manifestations of the "bad management" leading to takeovers is an overly cautious debt policy. Because of the differing incentives of shareholders and managers, it is plausible that managers would choose to borrow less than a value-maximizing amount since the risks associated with low earnings or bankruptcy might be more costly to managers than to shareholders. If the incumbent managers are too risk averse, for example, new management could increase value because of its decision to borrow more.
In addition, of course, one would expect increases in borrowing to the extent that takeovers increase value by improving management or the utilization of assets, since these activities essentially increase the scale of the firm, presumably lowering the marginal borrowing cost for a given absolute level of debt. But unlike the first two cases, this would not necessarily lead to increased debt-equity ratios, nor would it be associated with a particular type of merger, such as one in which risk is reduced or the target initially has a low debt-equity ratio. Our estimates (in Auerbach and Reishus l988a) suggested that tax benefits realizable through increased use of tax losses and credits were potentially present in about 20 percent of the mergers, with an average value of just over 10 percent of the target's market value in the year before the merger. We found smaller evident benefits from stepping up the asset basis, but we encountered substantial difficulty in estimating these benefits. Perhaps most surprising, though we found noticeable increases in the absolute combined level of debt, we found negligible increases in combined debt-equity ratios (calculated before the merger by combining the debt and equity values for the separate firms) over the period beginning two years before the merger years and ending two years after.
In our second paper we focused on the relationship between the form of the transaction and the type of tax benefits available. We found that virtually all transactions were either nontaxable stock transactions or taxable cash transactions, the majority being of the first type. This point is significant because in nontaxable transactions the firm has opted for a corporate reorganization, which generally cannot include a liquidation and step-up of asset bases. Under a taxable transaction either a liquidation with a step-up or a transfer of tax attributes may be chosen.
This suggests that taxable transactions might be more common when the potential basis step-up benefits are large, but we could identify no such relationship, perhaps in part because of our inability to measure the benefits precisely. Moreover, since the transfer of tax losses and credits is also treated somewhat differently under a taxable transaction than under a tax-free reorganization, there could be cases in which firms opting for a transfer of tax benefits would still prefer the taxable (to the shareholder) transaction. Thus, it is possible that firms would be responsive to taxes in their merger planning without there being any discernable relationship between the type of tax benefits available and the form of the transaction. This leaves the merger decision itself to be evaluated in assessing the importance of tax factors.
A Model of Mergers and Acquisitions
In this section we describe a simple model of mergers and acquisitions. Though it is particularly well-suited to the questions we seek to answer, it is also applicable more generally. Hall (1988) uses a related model in her study in this volume of the relationship between mergers and research and development.
The model begins with several simplifying assumptions. Although billed as a marriage model, the marriage process is one not now favored by most cultures, namely, polygamy. We assume that targets can be acquired only once within a year and that acquirers can seek as many targets as they wish. This latter assumption leads to a model of the "choice" made by prospective targets among alternative acquirers.
We assume that in each year every potential parent, x, evaluates a function, M(x,y), that indicates the joint gains to be had from acquiring a target, y. The function M(x,y) may take on negative values, since there may be substantial transaction costs involved in a successful acquisition. If V0(y) is the value of y if it is not taken over, then firm x will pay up to V0(y) + M(x,y) to acquire y. Thus, in a competitive market fory, the firm with the highest valuation of y, say f, will acquire y if M(x*,y) > 0, for a price between V0(y) + M(x*,y) and V0(y) + max M(x',y). Note that the observed merger premium may be less than M(x',y), since the possibility of a merger may have led the prior price to exceed V0(y).
We assume that the function M(x,y) has the specification (1) M(x,y) = z includes variables that relate only to the target, only to the parent, or to both, and is a random disturbance representing benefits to the merger not observed by the investigator. Perhaps the most crucial assumption we make is the one that leads to a tractable empirical model. This is that the error term is uncorrelated with the observed variables and takes on the extreme value distribution. Following McFadden (1973) , it is then possible to express the probability that will acquire y as (2) = + which is a multinominal logit model of dimension N + I, where N is the number of potential parent firms and the extra dimension is added by the possibility that no merger will occur. As is well known, the multinomial logit model has certain strong properties, such as the independence of irrelevant alternatives, which in this case seems justifiable. This property also simplifies the estimation procedure relative to an alternative approach, such as the multinomial probit. Even for a multinomial logit, however, it is impractical to estimate a model of our dimensions. This estimation problem has been dealt with in the previous literature in two ways. One approach is to include a small sample of the alternatives. In the current model this would mean that each observation would involve a potential target and several, rather than all, potential acquirers. For our model this estimation approach would pose problems. Many of the parent firm characteristics that appear in the vector z, such as industry dummy variables, occur relatively infrequently in the population. Thus, it might be necessary to include a relatively large number of alternative parents to achieve adequate sampling,
The alternative estimation approach is to treat all combinations with a particular target, except one, as an aggregate "all other" state. This aggregation is not straightforward because of the nonlinearity of the logistic specification. Suppose that for the observation of a potential target firm y the "all other" state includes all possible combinations aside from the one with potential parent x1. To convert the multinomial logit specification (2) . . , In(N -I) + + or, letting fl be the matrix whose ijth element is the sample covariance between independent variables i and j, (6) ln(N -1) + + As argued by McFadden (1984) , this approximate specification is exact when the elements of the vector z are joint normally distributed, for then the higher moments of the Taylor approximation vanish.
This second approach to estimating a high-dimension multinomial logit is well suited for our problem because the sample means and variances of the independent variables of our model are easily estimated and have an intuitive economic interpretation.
Sampling and Data Preparation
The literature on mergers and acquisitions contains several attempts to estimate the factors leading to firms' being taken over (for example, Palepu 1986 ) by examining the differences between firms acquired and firms not acquired. By looking at merger pairs, rather than just targets, and including firms that were not acquired in the estimation procedure, it should, in principle, be possible to distinguish factors that affect the probability of a firm's being acquired from those that determine the actual match that occurs. The acquisition probability should be influenced by target-specific variables that enter both branches of the model just outlined, while the actual match should be influenced by variables that depend on the actual pairing of the potential target and parent. This is quite important in the current context, where the tax benefits available from a merger depend not only on the tax status of the potential target but also on the ability of the potential acquirer to use these benefits. If mergers occur for tax reasons, one would not expect the firms acquired by Penn Central to have the same tax characteristics as those acquired by IBM.
To the 316 observations we had on firms that were acquired, we added a similar number of observations of firms chosen at random from the Compustat universe of firms, according to the following stratified sampling method.2 For each actual merger, we created a corresponding "pseudomerger" by selecting a "pseudotarget" firm from all firms in the same size class and year as the target, and a "pseudoparent" firm from all firms in the same size class and year as the real acquirer. The sample of pseudomergers therefore looks almost identical to the actual merger sample in terms of size and year, but it may differ with respect to other variables of interest.
For each observation we constructed variables for the target-parent pair and then constructed corresponding variables for the aggregate "all other" pairs according to expression (6). The variables were either taken directly or constructed from raw data provided by the Compustat files or the annual reports and 10-K filings.
We employed this particular sampling method for two reasons. Although the optimal sampling scheme is uncertain, it has been suggested that an equal number of different alternatives is a good rule of thumb for minimizing variance of estimates when the sample size is limited (Cosslett 1981) . The need to obtain from microfiche the tax information for each observation served to limit our own ability to expand the sample. The reason for stratifying the sample by size and year is to match closely the mergers and pseudomergers by variables that may be important but not of direct interest. Perhaps more importantly, this stratification serves to limit the unwanted effects of unobserved vanables correlated with year and size, as well as the direct effects of time and relative size that we would be unable to specify exactly. What we gain in precision in our variables of interest we lose in determining the effect of time and relative size on merger activity,
Nontax Vanables
To test the importance of tax factors, it is necessary to control for the other factors likely to affect mergers. Not doing so would certainly L lead to incorrect conclusions. For example, in our previous work we discovered that there were nine cases in the 316 mergers in which both parent and target were tax constrained. Most of these, however, were mergers of two firms within a single industry, where a high correlation of profitability would lead one to expect a positive correlation of the incidence of tax constraints. Thus, if firms in the same industry are more likely to merge than firms in different industries, not controlling for this factor could lead to a downward bias in the estimated impact of tax factors.
Target-Specific Variables
As discussed above, target-specific variables are those which affect the probability of a firm's being taken over, rather than the probability of a specific merger. We include dummy variables for the target firm's one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry, to account for the fact that mergers might relate to overall industry conditions.
To pick up growth-related merger motives, we include the target firm's five-year geometric growth rate of sales.
To gauge management competence, we would like a measure of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost value of its assets. Since firm assets include assets beyond those included in capital stock measures, we suppose that each firm's true capital stock takes the form
where K1 is the fixed capital stock, a, is a parameter to be estimated, and 5, is a proxy for intangible assets, such as research and development expenditures or advertising. This statement leads to the inclusion of the variables K1 -V and S,, where V is the firm's market value, which we approximate by the market value of equity at the close of the previous year plus the book value of the firm's financial liabilities. In some specifications these variables are expressed as ratios with respect to market value.
Pair-Specific Variables
Among the pair-specific variables we include dummy variables if the parent and target are in the same industry. Because it is unclear how close two firms must be for them to be in the "same" industry, we specify three dummy variables, equal to one if the two firms are in the same one-digit, two-digit, and four-digit SIC industries, respectively.
Finally, we specify two dummy variables based on the relative size of the two firms. The "same size" dummy variable equals one if the prospective parent firm is in the same size class as the target or the next higher size class (these classes are defined in section 1 of the appendix). For example, if the target firm had a market value of $200 million, this variable would equal one for a parent with value between $100 million and $500 million. The second size dummy, for "larger size," equals one if the parent is in one of the next two higher size classes; in the example, this would be a firm with a value between $500 million and $5 billion in assets. Both dummy variables equal zero only if the parent is substantially larger than the target (or much smaller, though this event does not occur in the data set).
Tax Variables
There are several variables we consider to be tax-related. The first is the target firm's debt-equity ratio. As suggested above, this could indicate the presence of a potential for increasing interest deductions, We would have preferred to include other variables potentially related to borrowing, such as the reduction in risk, but data on the covariance of firm earnings were not available or even estimable from the data we had.
The remaining variables are pair-specific. The first is the estimated tax gain available from stepping up the basis of the target's assets. Because equipment sales and liquidations are subject to recapture at ordinary income tax rates, the main gains to be had from avoiding capital gains taxes should be those associated with structures and depletable resources. The appendix describes the algorithm used to estimate these gains. Given the assumptions necessary to make these calculations, the estimates are subject to substantial error and could greatly understate the potential gains in cases where the targeted firm has assets that have been on its books for many years or have appreciated in value at a rate in excess of the inflation rate, or both.
The appendix also describes the method used to estimate the gains from the use of tax credits and tax losses. We assume such gains to be zero unless one of the firms is fully taxable and the other is tax constrained. This is a conservative assumption, since there should be some gains in any case where the taxable income of the two firms is not perfectly correlated. These gains are hard to measure, however, and arguably too small to have an impact on merger decisions. Where the tax gain is positive, it is calculated under the assumption that the firm with tax benefits becomes a shell after the merger, generating neither positive nor negative taxable income, and that the taxable firm uses these benefits to the extent that the law permits. Here, we ignore the additional restrictions that might apply to the full use of benefits in particular cases, because of our inability to identify such cases.
The remaining tax variables have to do with the shareholder tax incentives for cash acquisitions. Here we are limited by the absence of a clear theory about the constraints firms face in avoiding dividend taxes. If share repurchases are costly, then, as discussed above, a firm wishing to distribute cash in excess of dividends will have the incentive to engage in cash acquisitions in addition to repurchasing its own shares. The same incentive would not be present for a firm already issuing new equity, since cash acquisitions could not be financed by internal funds. We therefore would expect constrained firms to be more likely to engage both in share repurchases and cash acquisitions. This suggests that we include dummy variables indicating whether the parent or pseudoparent firm has repurchased its own shares in the past two years and whether it has sold common equity in the past two years (in excess of threshold values of 4 percent of the firm's shares). In an earlier study (Auerbach and Reishus 1988b) we did indeed find that, among firms that acquire, the probability of using cash as a means of payment is (insignificantly) higher for firms that have recently repurchased their own shares and (significantly) lower for those that have recently issued new shares.
Calculation of Variables for the Aggregate Alternative
For each observation it is necessary to calculate the values of each of the above variables that correspond to the state representing a merger with one of "all other" potential parent firms. The only new calculations needed, however, are those for pair-specific variables, since the others have a value that is independent of the characteristics of the potential parent.
For each pair-specific variable the sample mean must be estimated for inclusion in the vector z,,, and the sample covariance matrix is needed as well. For the dummy variables the mean is simply the fraction of the population in that category (defined to be all firms of equal or greater size). For example, the mean corresponding to the "same industry" dummy variable is the fraction of potential parent firms in the target's industry. The covariance term between dummy variables equals the difference between the fraction of the sample satisfying both characteristics and the fraction that would be predicted by multiplying the sample means of each dummy variable.
For the continuous tax variables the aggregate calculations are based on the simplifying assumption that the value is either zero or a constant amount based on the parent firm's tax status not being affected by combining with the target. For example, a firm with tax losses that acquires a profitable firm retains excess losses after offsetting the target's taxable income, and a taxable parent firm uses all the tax benefits of the target. This is quite reasonable given the relative sizes of acquired and acquiring firms. Once this value, say T, is calculated for each potential target firm, the aggregate mean is calculated as the product of this variable and the fraction of firms in the state where the tax benefit can be used (taxable if the target is nontaxable, and taxconstrained if the target is taxable). The covariance term of this variable with the same-industry dummy, for example, equals the fraction of all firms in the same industry and the opposite tax state of the potential target, less the product of the same industry fraction and the opposite tax state fraction, all multiplied by the magnitude of the tax benefit.
Results
Before turning to the model estimates themselves, it is useful and informative to compare selected statistics for the two samples of firm pairs, those that actually merged and those that did not. Table 6 .1 presents mean changes in debt-value ratios for the two samples, broken down further by the relative sizes of target and parent. For actual mergers the change is measured by subtracting the ratio of the two firms' debt to those firms' debt plus equity two years before the merger year from the same ratio for the surviving firm two years after the merger. Because of data problems, only long-term debt (at book value) is used in the calculation. The four-year period is used to distinguish "long run" leverage changes from those that might occur only temporarily around the merger date. For the pseudomergers the combined ratio is used for both dates in computing the change.
The results in table 6.1 cast doubt on the association of mergers with increases in indebtedness. For only two of the five groups does the difference in means have the "right" (positive) sign, and for neither of these classes (or for the total sample) is the difference significant. Only for the class where the targets are roughly equal in size to the parents is there any discernible change in leverage, and here there are too few observations to draw any conclusions. This does suggest that data from the post-1983 period, which involved many more acquisitions of large firms, would be useful to examine. Note: Relative target size is the ratio of the target's value (debt plus equity) to the parent's value in the year before merger. The total number of firms is somewhat lower than the overall sample size because of missing data. The f-statistics are for a test of equality of means. Means are unweighted within each cell. .100
Note: Gains are expressed as a fraction of the target firm's value (long-term debt plus equity). Mean gains are for those pairs with positive gains, with target firm's values used when weighting. Table 6 .2 presents estimates of the potential tax gains from the transfer of tax losses and credits between parent and target. Again, the calculations are done for both actual mergers and pseudomergers. For the real mergers just under one-fifth of the pairs exhibit a tax gain, with a mean weighted gain of 10.5 percent of the target's market value. This mean is larger than the estimate given in our earlier paper, in which a cruder method was used to calculate the gain. There are fewer cases where the gain comes from the parent, but the average gain in these cases is estimated to be much larger. The incidence of tax benefits among the pseudomergers is remarkably similar, a result that suggests the transfer of tax losses and credits may not be an important factor in the merger decision. There is a noticeable difference between the samples, however, in the magnitude of gains coming from cases in which the parent firm has unused tax losses or credits. These gains are on average much lower for the pseudomerger sample than for the actual merger sample. Distinguishing the source of the tax gain may, therefore, be important in the estimation procedure. The estimated gains from the target's basis step-up are given in table Once again the differences between the two samples are negligible.
Further, based on our very imperfect measurement technique, the estimated potential tax benefits from basis step-up are quite small, averaging only about 2 percent of the target's value and exceeding 5 percent in only 7.8 percent of both real mergers and pseudomergers. We turn next to the estimates of the full merger model. Results for a variety of specifications are given in tables 6.4 and 6.5. The estimated equations differ according to whether certain variables are expressed in levels or relative to the market value of the targeted firm.4 Note: Gains are expressed as a fraction of the target firm's value. The total number of firms is somewhat lower than the overall sample size because of missing data. Table 6 .4 presents estimates based on the level specification, while those in table 6.5 are for the ratio form. The theoretical model introduced in section 6.5 does not allow us to determine in advance which of these specifications is to be preferred.
A number of variables are robust and quite significant in all the specifications. These include the target's debt-value ratio, which has a positive effect on the probability of a firm's being acquired; the target's sales growth rate; and the same-industry dummy variables, especially-that for the four-digit SIC industry. The fact that each of the same-industry dummy variables is always positive suggests that firms are more likely to merge the closer their industrial relationship. The increasing magnitude of the same industry coefficients as one moves from the one-digit to the four-digit variable means that the incremental effect is also increasing: Being in the same four-digit industry relative to the same two-digit industry has more of an effect on the merger probability than being in the same two-digit industry, as opposed to the same one-digit industry, for example. The results for the industry dummy variables are interesting but not unexpected; nor is the performance of the sales growth term, given a similar finding by Palepu (1986) . The influence of the debt-value ratio, however, is quite surprising, given the argument that firms with unused debt-capacity are more likely to be taken over. One possible explanation is that firms with high debt are firms in trouble, though other variables included in the regression are intended to control for this characteristic.
The industry dummy variables for the target suggest that (relative to the omitted industries, those with SIC codes beginning with 8, which include health, education, and engineering) in only two broad industry groups were firms more likely to be acquired during the period in question: transportation, communication, and utilities; and to a lesser extent finance, insurance, and real estate; Certain other variables are also robust to the choice of specification and always insignificant. These include the new share and repurchase variables and the parent size variables. The pattern of the size variables suggests that a firm is most likely to acquire other firms that are smaller than itself, but not too much smaller. This is consistent with our observation (Auerbach and Reishus 1988a ) that parents are typically larger than the targets they acquire but that relative size is The repurchase variable has the "wrong" sign in that it suggests firms that have repurchased are less likely to acquire other firms. This result does not necessarily constitute evidence against the "trapped equity" inducement for cash mergers. It may simply mean that firms wishing to get excess cash out of the corporate form tend to specialize in their method, either repurchasing or engaging in cash acquisitions. If this specialization were strong enough, the observation of a firm repurchasing would reduce the expectation that it would also engage in a cash merger, even though, conditional on its decision to acquire, it would still be more likely to use cash (as suggested by our previous results cited above). This problem of interpretation underscores the need for a more rigorous model of the constraints that cause equity to be "trapped" and the optimal behavior of firms in response to these constraints.
The performance of the remaining variables, including the tax variables, depends on the model specification. The tax gain variable always has the correct sign and is significant in the level specification. But when this variable is broken down into two variables according to the source of the tax gains (target or parent), only the tax gains from the potential parent are significant in the level specification. This is entirely consistent with the results given in table 6.2, where the only noticeable difference between the sample of real mergers and that of pseudomergers was for the case of parent-related tax gains. Moreover, it is plausible that the tax benefits of the target firm would present less of an incentive because of the additional restrictions on their use that we have not taken into account.
Despite this statistical significance, however, the tax variable for the parent is of little economic importance. Depending on the exact specification, setting the value of the parent's tax gain to zero (which simulates the impact of a policy change making the transfer of such benefits impossible) reduces the predicted number of mergers by between just under 1 percent and just over 1.5 percent. In contrast, the predicted number of mergers would be reduced by well over one-half by setting the same-industry (at the four-digit level) dummy variable equal to zero (which simulates the impact of a policy of prohibiting combinations of firms in the same four-digit industry occurring with a frequency that cannot be explained by other factors).
The basis step-up variable is disturbingly sensitive to whether the ratio or the level specification is used and to whether industry dummy variables are included. In the level specification it always has the wrong sign. In the ratio specification it has the wrong sign in the two specifications without industry dummies but is significant and has the predicted sign with the industry dummies present. If this last model were correct, the predicted decline in mergers associated with a removal of the tax benefits from basis step-up would be over 8 percent, much larger than the predicted impact of removing the ability to transfer losses and credits. Nonetheless, the instability of this variable's performance and the problems in its construction lead us to discount the importance of this result.
The results for the remaining three variables, which are intended to measure the difference between market value and the value of asset, are also sensitive to whether level or ratio form is used. Under the former all three are quite insignificant. Under the latter the gap between book and market value has the correct sign and is significant, while the R&D variable has the wrong sign and is significant. It should be pointed out, however, that this sign for R&D is "wrong" in a very limited sense, if R&D affects the merger probability only through its use in correcting our measure of the firm's asset replacement cost. If R&D spending exerts an independent influence on the probability of a firm's acquisition, it is not clear without further, modeling what sign one should expect it to have. In summary, then, the basic model specification seems good in that the variables one associates with acquisitions, such as industry relationship and growth, are consistently significant. The significance of the debt-value ratio is also quite robust, through we are not certain how this is to be explained. In light of the results in table 6.1, however, it is hard to argue that acquisitions by large corporations were driven during this period by the opportunity to tap unused target debt capacity.5 The performance of the tax gain variable suggests a mild, positive effect of tax losses and credits experienced by the potential acquirer, but little effect of those experienced by the potential target. Finally, the basis step-up variable, whose accuracy we have questioned, is of the correct sign (but significant) in only one specification. The values of the likelihood function for the ratio and level specifications are virtually identical, making it difficult to decide which model describes the data best.
Conclusion
The object of this paper has been to consider the impact of taxes on the frequency of mergers and acquisitions in the United States over the years 1968-83. To do this, we have compared the tax characteristics of a sample of merging firms to those of a similar sample of nonmerging firms chosen at random and, using both samples, estimated a "marriage" model of merger activity. Our results suggests that the potential increase in interest deductions could not have been an important factor influencing merger activity during the period in question. The two sampies exhibit very insignificant differences in borrowing patterns, and the logit model estimates suggest that a lower debt-equity ratio is associated with a lower probability that a firm will be acquired.
Likewise, the tax benefits associated with acquiring a firm having tax losses or unused tax credits appear to exert an insignificant influence on merger activity. The frequency and size of the tax benefits are virtually the same in the actual merger sample and the pseudomerger sample, and the size of the potential benefit has no explanatory power in the merger model. One reason for this may be the existence of a variety of restrictions on the use of the tax benefits that, because of their complexity, we have ignored in our analysis.
The two potential tax benefits that do appear to have some impact on merger activity are the use of tax losses and credits by acquiring companies to offset the taxable income of the firms they acquire and the option to step up the basis of the assets of the acquired firms without paying corporate capital gains taxes. The first of these is significant in some of the model estimates and is more important in the sample of real mergers than in the sample of pseudomergers. Even so, it is of little economic importance in explaining the frequency of mergers. The second potential benefit is significant in one of the specifications estimated, but it has the unexpected sign in all others. Given the difficulty we have encountered in measuring this variable accurately, we are somewhat suspicious of this finding of potential significance.
As to the avoidance of individual taxes, we have found that firms that repurchased their own shares in the previous two years are less likely to acquire other firms. This result is hard to reconcile with the theory that firms seek cash acquisitions to free "trapped equity" without a rigorous model of the constraints on and determinants of repurchase activity.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 attempted to discourage tax-driven acquisitions by repealing the "general utilities" doctrine, which permitted the tax-free basis step-up, and by limiting the acquirer's use of the tax losses and credits of the acquired firm. Our findings suggest that the latter restriction is of little importance. Ironically, the use of the acquirer's tax benefits, which appears to have some impact on merger activity, was not restricted by the recent legislation. A change that, some have argued, could encourage mergers is the strengthening of the corporate alternative minimum tax. Just as with the asymmetry associated with gains and losses, it will be possible for firms subject to the minimum tax to combine with taxable firms not subject to the minimum tax and reduce combined tax payments. But the potential tax reductions would appear smaller (since the difference between the two firms' marginal tax rates is lower) than for the combination of a taxable and nontaxable firm. Given our findings about mergers between these types of firms, we strongly doubt that the minimum tax provisions will have a significant impact on merger activity.
The results in this paper should be regarded with caution because we had to make many assumptions to estimate the potential tax benefits associated with particular mergers. Without access to the confidential tax returns of the firms involved, these assumptions were unavoidable. Another research limitation that deserves mention is the terminal date of our sample-early 1983. Since then, the character of the acquisition process has changed, with many more "megamergers" occurring in which larger firms were acquired. There is some inconclusive evidence in our table 6.1 that these mergers may, on average, be associated with increases in leverage for the combined enterprise. Recent observations should facilitate a more precise evaluation of this proposition, along with the one that borrowing to finance acquisitions has, in general, become more important in recent years.
Appendix
In this appendix, we describe the methods used for sampling and for calculating the variables.
Sampling
The actual and "pseudo" samples were matched by year and by the assets of both parent and target. The methods for calculating assets are explained below. The size categories were (in millions) 1-10, 10-25, 25-50, 50-100, 100-250, 250-500, 500-1,000, 1,000-5,000, 5,000+, as well as a category for missing values. The missing values were eliminated for the regressions, which left 310 actual mergers and 291 pseudomergers. The difference is due to the inability to collect meaningful tax or asset information on a portion of the pseudo mergers.
Gain from the Use of Tax Losses and Credits
This calculation uses information on the income tax paid, tax loss carryforward, and investment tax credit carryforward obtained from corporate reports. When a firm without carryforwards and positive tax payments combines with a firm that has carryforwards, we calculate the potential benefit. We assume that the unconstrained firms' level of tax payments grows at a 10 percent nominal rate into the future, while the firm with the loss carryforward contributes no new losses but also no new taxable income in the future-it is simply a shell for holding tax loss carryforwards. We then calculate the net present value of the tax payments (discounted at 10 percent), combining the two firms' tax attributes through the period when the carryforward is used up or expires. The net present value of the tax payments of the two firms separately is also calculated using the same assumptions for the same time period. The difference between the combined calculation and the sum of the separate calculations is the tax benefit.
The aggregate calculation is much cruder. If the target is paying positive taxes, we use three times the tax payment as the tax gain from merging with a parent that has a tax loss carryforward as indicated by Compustat. For targets with tax losses we use the value of the actual tax loss as the potential benefit for parents that do not have tax loss carryforwards as indicated by Compustat.
Basis Step-Up
We begin with the firm's book value of fixed assets at the end of the last year before the merger. Using data on the firm's gross investment and the capital stock at the end of the earliest year for which it is available for the firm, we employ the "perpetual inventory" method to estimate the rate of declining balance depreciation that is consistent with the firm's initial and terminal capital stocks. Given this estimate of economic depreciation, we then estimate the current market value of the capital stock by multiplying the capital remaining from different vintages by the ratio of the price (represented by the GNP deflator) in the current year to that for the year in which the capital was purchased: We also assume that the initial capital stock was valued correctly on the firm books. That is, we solve for from the equation:
where K, is the book capital stock at the end of year t and I, is fixed investment in year t. We then calculate the market value of the capital stock as
We assume that a fraction, 0, of this market value represents structures, where 0 is the fraction that structures represent for all firms in the same industry (taken from Auerbach 1983) . Note that this operation will understate the market value of assets that have increased in nominal value at a rate in excess of the GNP deflator or were worth more than their book value even at time zero.
Since structures are written off at a different rate from equipment, they will generally represent a different fraction of the book capital stock than of the market value capital stock. Since structures decay more slowly than equipment, the book fraction will be smaller: Inflation has a greater effect on the ratio of the current value to book value as the time since purchase increases.
If one assumes that the structures fraction of the firm's capital stock at time zero was also 0, and that structures are written off at the declining balance rate -y, it follows that the book value of structures at date Tis
where rr is the average inflation rate over the period 0 to 1', and g is the nominal growth rate of investment in structures. These rates are easily calculated for each firm. We set y = .033, the aggregate value derived in Auerbach and Hines (1987) .
Given the market value of the firm's structures capital stock, we estimate the alter-tax value of depreciation allowances the firm would receive by multiplying the corporate tax rate by the average present value of depreciation allowances on all structures, estimated by Auerbach and Hines (1987) . It is somewhat more difficult to estimate the depreciation allowances the firm would receive if continuing along its previous depreciation schedule, since its capital stock purchase dates are unknown. We simply assume the allowances would have the same present value as is available on new capital per each dollar of remaining basis. Moreover, we assume that recapture will neutralize the additional depreciation allowances received on increases in basis up to the straightline basis, and that this latter basis equals the actual book value. Thus, the net estimated gain is the present value of the depreciation allowances of new structures, multiplied by the corporate tax rate, multiplied by the difference between the market and book value estimates for structures. For 35 real targets and 46 hypothetical targets the data were insufficient to perform the basis step-up calculations. For these firms we use an imputed value equal to the sample average. Use of a separate missing-value dummy variable did not substantively alter the results.
Asset Value
Based on Compustat data the value of a firm is calculated as the market (year-end) value of common stock plus the book value of longterm debt, short-term debt, and preferred stock in the year preceding the merger. For an important fraction of targets a closing stock price was unavailable for that year; if the calculation provided a missing value, we took this value from the previous year. Notes 1. We have since discovered problems with data for two of the mergers and so report on only 316 observations in this paper.
2. There are actually 291 such observations because of data problems encountered alter the second sample was chosen.
3. These are given for all targets and pseudotargets, including the relatively small number matched with a nontaxable parent or pseudoparent that could not use the tax benefits. In the estimation procedure below the potential gain is set to zero in such cases.
4. In all versions of the model estimates reported in the paper, we weight each observation based on the sampling frequency of the target firm's size class as well as status (acquired or not acquired). In principle this is the correct approach, although it gives some observations substantial weight. We also tried an alternative weighting scheme that did not distinguish sample weights by size. The coefficients for most variables were nearly identical, although one of the tax variables, the parent's tax gain, had its size reduced somewhat in some specifications.
5. Needless to say, one cannot and should not interpret this finding as applying to the going-private leveraged buyouts that are not included in our sample.
The authors' conclusion that taxes are an insignificant factor in the merger process is consistent with recent discussions outside academia. In evaluating the potential impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on merger activity, the head of the merger division at a major accounting firm estimated that no more than 5 percent of all mergers are "tax driven" (Mergers and Acquisitions 1986, p. 10) . Although this exceeds Auerbach and Reishus's estimate, the similarity between the two values is encouraging.
While I believe the general conclusion that taxes are not a critical factor in explaining the growth of merger activity in the 1980s, I suspect that Auerbach and Reishus may understate the importance of taxes in the most recent mergers. Their sample period ends in early 1983. Three developments since then may have increased the role of tax factors. First, the number of firms with net operating losses and loss carryforwards rose substantially after 1981 because of the rapid asset writeoffs provided by the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) and the deep recession of 1982. The sample includes only one year of this new regime, when transactions designed to take advantage of tax losses would be especially likely. The one post-1981 year included in the sample, 1982, may also differ from subsequent years because at that time firms were still permitted to use "safe harbor" leasing to transfer tax benefits from tax loss firms to taxable firms. Second, the advent of the ACRS increased the incentive for selling assets to step up their basis. Again, this effect would be strongest in the years after the authors' sample period. Finally, the "junk bond" market became a much more important part of the takeover process after 1982 (see Taggart 1988) . Thus, by focusing on mergers that took place during the late l960s and the 1970s, the authors may not capture the importance of taxes in recent takeovers.
At the same time, however, some countervailing factors may lead the authors to overstate the importance of taxes. I describe three potential problems below and illustrate each by referring to tax loss carryforwards. Similar arguments could be made with respect to the other tax incentives for merger.
The first potential problem arises in measuring the size of tax benefits. Auerbach and Reishus implicitly assume that the tax benefit from merging equals the face value of the resulting tax savings. They assume, for example, that a firm with a tax loss carryforward (TLCF) that was party to an acquisition would not have utilized it unless it was involved in a takeover. This assumption probably overstates the gain from merging because mergers are only one of the ways a firm can benefit from a loss carryforward. TLCF firms could alternatively issue new shares and use the proceeds to purchase bonds, generating taxable interest income effectively taxed at the capital gains rate for shareholders.
One could argue that many firms with TLCFs face substantial difficulty raising equity capital. This may be true. These firms might also find it difficult to locate merger partners, however. The relevant issue concerns the alternative opportunities for those TLCF firms that are attractive merger partners; these firms may have many other channels for realizing some of their tax benefits. Similar arguments apply to tax gains from basis step-up and increased leverage (see Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson 1986) . By assuming that the nonmerger alternatives yield no tax benefits, the authors overstate the tax incentives to merge. Since they conclude that taxes are unimportant in the merger process, this argument reinforces their results.
The second potential problem is one of measurement errors in estimated tax benefits. The previous argument implies that the merger tax gains for many firms may be overstated. It does not necessarily imply that errors of different magnitudes affect different firms. Such differential errors may, however, be induced by the problems of measuring both TLCFs and potential basis step-ups.
Financial statements provide an imperfect guide to a firm's tax loss carryforwards. Auerbach and Poterba (1987) observed substantial disparities between estimates of loss carryforwards based on Internal Revenue Service data and those based on financial statements. An additional problem in analyzing mergers comes from the idiosyncratic character of tax benefits. The rules for utilizing loss carryforwards are complex and have varied over time. The 1976 The , 1982 Tax Reform Acts all affected the use of carryforwards in corporate acquisitions. The simple assumption that taxable firms acquiring firms with losses can use these losses may therefore induce substantial measurement error.
Similar problems arise in calculating the potential gains from basis step-up for individual firms. The authors use a sophisticated algorithm based on average asset composition in each industry. Differences across firms in asset decay rates, in the fraction of assets that have been sold or acquired through takeovers, or even in the types of assets that are used can make these estimates an unreliable guide to potential tax benefits.
The real difficulty with the errors of measurement in both TLCFs and potential basis step-ups is that they are likely to be correlated with the dependent variable, an indicator variable for the presence or absence of a merger. Given two firms with identical estimated potential tax benefits in an acquisition, there is a positive correlation between the measurement error (true benefit minus measured benefit) and the probability of observing a merger. This correlation may contaminate the statistical analysis.
The final problem, one of tax status endogeneity, arises because there are no controlled experiments for analyzing how tax policy affects merger probabilities. We cannot endow an otherwise healthy firm with a $100 million tax loss carryforward and study whether or not it is acquired. Rather, we must track how TLCFs generated by previous corporate actions influence takeover probabilities. The difficulty with this approach is not confined to the Auerbach and Reishus paper; it affects virtually all cross-sectional studies of taxes and firm behavior,
The basic problem is that the presence of a TLCF may signal many things. First, it indicates a potential tax benefit for an acquirer. Second, however, it may suggest that the firm has experienced severe business difficulties. While an otherwise healthy firm with TLCFs might make a very attractive acquisition target, the typical TLCF firm may in fact be very unattractive. Finally, however, there is an opposite bias that is stressed in practitioner accounts of the merger process. Firms with TLCFs have typically faced tight cash flow constraints in the recent past, and they may have postponed high-return investment projects because of this. These firms may therefore be attractive takeover targets for reasons other than their tax status. Separating the direct (tax) effects of loss carryforwards from the other real effects correlated with them is extremely difficult. The authors control for the target's sales growth rate, but this variable is unlikely to capture all of the relevant aspects of recent corporate performance that affect takeover probabilities.
In spite of these three difficulties, I am still inclined to believe the authors' basic findings. Their results suggest that certain types of corporate tax benefits are not important explanators of recent merger activity. The results do not imply, however, that taxes play a small role in the takeover process. A casual reader of takeover trade publications, such as Mergers and Acquisitions, discovers about one-fifth of the articles are devoted to taxation. Can this be reconciled with the Auerbach and Reishus findings? It could be if there is relatively little money to be made from the tax-related aspects of a merger but much to be lost from incorrect tax planning. Tax considerations may therefore be defensive, not offensive, aspects of acquisition activity.
Some contests for corporate control may also be driven by tax factors besides the ones considered in the paper. Leveraged buyouts, for example, have received substantial tax subsidies (see Shleifer and Vishny 1988) , but they do not feature in Auerbach and Reishus's analysis of mergers between two firms. has proposed a "trapped equity" model of takeover activity, by which acquisitions provide a taxfavored channel for transferring resources to shareholders. If King's analysis is correct, the double-taxation of dividend income may partly explain why firms engage in takeovers. In this volume Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) provide some evidence against this view by cornparing methods of payment in the United States and the United Kingdom, but the argument is still important in explaining how taxes can influence merger activity through channels other than those considered by Auerbach and Reishus. The results of this study suggest that corporate marriages are made in heaven, not in the tax lawyer's office. Although that may seem like the way it should be, this presumption may be seriously wrong. The optimal tax policy toward corporate acquisitions depends upon a variety of factors. If takeovers tend to promote efficient management, the socially optimal policy may require provision of some tax benefits for merging firms (see Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson, 1986) . Such a policy would generate an additional incentive for merging, potentially offsetting the costs associated with the takeover process. If, however, takeovers are largely conflicts between stake holders and "stake eaters," as in the Shleifer-Summers (1988) analysis earlier in this volume, and if they adversely affect economic performance, it may be appropriate to place a tax penalty on acquisitive firms. Research like that by Auerbach and Reishus provides the empirical groundwork for future analyses of the optimal taxation of corporate combinations.
Comment
John B. Shoven I like the idea for the Auerbach and Reishus paper-an assessment of the importance of taxes in mergers. The authors review several theoretical tax rationales for mergers and then proceed to an empirical examination of their effects. Before commenting on this study, however, I should mention there are aggregate facts about mergers that do not seem to be related to tax factors. One is that merger activity is markedly cyclical. It would be interesting to know whether there are more firms with loss carryforwards or unused investment tax credits when merger activity is high than when it is low. Some relatively aggregate correlations between the tax factors and merger activity would therefore have been interesting in Auerbach and Reishus's paper. I am skeptical that the correlations would be consistent with the tax theories, but I have trouble determining whether I reached this prior before or after peeking at the results of their paper.
The authors discuss three main ways taxes might affect the merger decision. First, either the target or the acquirer may have unused loss carryforwards and credits. Merging is a potential way of accelerating their use and possibly salvaging them before they expire. Although this may provide an incentive to merge in some cases, the authors' earlier work had found that there was no transfer of carryforwards or credits in slightly over 80 percent of the observed mergers between 1968 and 1983. In this paper, with their construction of hypothetical mergers to be compared with actual mergers, they find there is a tax carryover transfer in 19.2 percent of the hypothetical mergers (versus 19.3 percent for the actual mergers). The weighted average gain is higher for the actual mergers, but this is largely because of the seven instances where the gain resulting from offsetting the parent's unused losses and credits exceeds 25 percent of the target's value. Several of these seven instances (there were only two such cases in the hypothetical merger sample) may have resulted from the same parent (for example, Penn Central). Certainly, the difference in the average gain between the real mergers and the hypothetical ones is the result of a very small number of cases with large gains. It is not at all clear that it is statistically significant.
Certainly, the conclusion of this paper, and of the authors' earlier work-namely, the use of tax carryforwards and credits cannot explain most mergers because these factors are not present in over 80 percent of mergers-is an important one. Even before engaging in high-power John B. Shoven is professor of economics and chairman of the Department of Economics at Stanford University and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. econometrics, the authors are left with only a relatively small role for that theory in the merger decision.
The second corporate tax theory regarding mergers is the step-up in basis and the potential redepreciation of assets after a merger. This redepreciation is profitable only if the difference between the market value and book value of acquired assets is not treated as fully taxable income. Until recently, at least for plant, the gain was less than fully taxed and thus there was an incentive for redepreciation.
Several severe problems arise in measuring with publicly available data the size of the potential tax advantage resulting from a step-up in basis. Auerbach and Reishus do not have any information regarding the market value of a firm's assets. Further, they do not know the age structure of the assets or what fraction of them are plant. The variable they construct is presumably measured with considerable error, and this may account for its failure to be significant in their merger regressions.
The third theory, that the merged company can carry more debt than the separate firms is questionable. The authors do not have information on the variance of the target's earnings or on the covariance of those earnings with the parent's earnings. It seems very doubtful that the observed debt-equity ratio of the target gives reliable information about the extra debt-carrying capacity that the merger would permit. The authors'S finding that mergers are much more likely between firms in the same narrowly defined industry indicates that earnings-source diversification and hence greater debt-carrying capacity are not important determinants of mergers.
I find the paper quite convincing that the tax theories are not the most important determinants of mergers. But I also believe the early tables comparing the actual and hypothetical mergers convey that message quite adequately. Most researchers would have stopped right there and declared the result. The authors are to be admired for not letting this deter them and proceeding to develop their logit "marriage" model of mergers. The main result, however, is not fundamentally changed by all their efforts. It still appears, much to the dismay of public finance economists, that the tax factors are not of paramount importance in the merger decision.
